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COPYRIGHT COMPETITION: THE
SHIFTING BOUNDARIES OF
CONVERGENCE BETWEEN U.S. AND
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT REGIMES IN
THE DIGITAL AGE
INTRODUCTION
s we move further and further into the digital age, it has
become increasingly easy to create, locate, develop, and
share information online. With the near universal proliferation
of the Internet in North America,1 measures have been taken to
ensure that those who hold copyright in their created works may
remain certain that their intellectual property rights remain
protected.2 Additionally, the digital age has afforded users man-
ifold opportunity to both create and share infringing materials,
and this ease has led to international tension concerning online
media piracy. As the case has been throughout the entire history
of intellectual property protection, a theoretical debate rages:
Should the law seek to protect the parties that principally create
content in order to provide economic incentive for those creators,
or should it place an emphasis on free dissemination of infor-
mation, those seeking to create thereby garnering inspiration
from multiple sources?3
Throughout the twenty-first century, there has been a contin-
uous shift toward a restrictive system of transnational copyright
protection in the digital context. Nonetheless, there has cer-
tainly been some pushback to the most extreme forms of digital
1. As of November 2014, 87.9 percent of North America was connected. In-
ternet Usage and 2015 Population in North America, INTERNETWORLD STATS,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm#north (last visited Jan. 14,
2015).
2. See, e.g., Derek J. Schaffner, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act:
Overextension of Copyright Protection and the Unintended Chilling Effects on
Fair Use, Free Speech, and Innovation, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 145
(2004).
3. JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY
5–19 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining the “theoretical underpinnings” of copyright
law).
A
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rights protection.4 In 2011, the Stop Online Piracy Act5 (SOPA)
and the Protect Intellectual Property Act6 (PIPA) were intro-
duced respectively to the U.S. House of Representatives and
Senate. These two bills, and in particular, their more extreme
protective measures,7 were met with outrage from the online
community.8 As a result, neither Act has come into force.9 Seem-
ingly in response to both SOPA and PIPA and to its prior place
on the U.S. Department of Trade’s “Priority Watch List” for
online piracy,10 Canada’s majority federal government11 enacted
the Copyright Modernization Act (CMA) in 201212 to update its
Copyright Act.13 Certain provisions of the CMA resemble those
in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and SOPA, yet
the CMA in some aspects goes even further in restrictions such
as the digital locks provisions that target subversion of techno-
logical protective measures in particular.14 Consequently, it
seems that the major U.S. and Canadian copyright legislation
4. Jenna Wortham, Public Outcry Over Antipiracy Bills Began as Grass-
Roots Grumbling: Many Voices on the Web, Amplified by Social Media, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, at B1.
5. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
6. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of In-
tellectual Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
7. See infra Part IV.B.
8. Wortham, supra note 4.
9. Id.
10. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2012 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2012)
[hereinafter 2012 SPECIAL 301 REPORT], http://www.ustr.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/2012%20Special%20301%20Report_0.pdf, to be discussed infra Part
V.
11. A majority government in Canadian Parliament means that one politi-
cal party controls a proportional majority of seats in the House of Commons.
In the 2011 federal election, Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservative
Party captured 166 of 308 seats, giving the government a wide mandate to
enact laws. Map of Official Results for the 41st General Election, ELECTIONS
(2011), http://www.elections.ca/res/cir/maps/images/ERMap_41.pdf. For more
information on the Canadian electoral process and the 2011 federal election in
particular, see generally JON H. PAMMETT & CHRISTOPHER DORNAN, THE
CANADIAN FEDERAL ELECTION OF 2011 (2012).
12. Copyright Modernization Act (Bill C–11), S.C. 2012, c. 20 (Can.).
13. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C–42 (Can.).
14. See infra Part IV.A; Barry Sookman, Change and the Copyright Mod-
ernization Act, BARRYSOOKMAN.COM (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.barrysook-
man.com/2012/11/07/change-and-the-copyright-modernization-act/.
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reforms in the past few years have been inspired by one an-
other.15 Each country looks to the other for stimulus in formu-
lating proposed legislation, with each new draft appearing more
extreme.
This Note argues that due to mutual pressures, the United
States’ and Canada’s copyright systems will continue to become
further restrictive in efforts to streamline the monitoring of con-
tent sharing between the countries and to take greater action
against cross-border media piracy. Part I will discuss the inher-
ent philosophical tensions that lie at the heart of copyright law
in general: whether to incentivize innovation or to protect the
rights of content creators. Part II will undertake a survey of both
U.S. and Canadian copyright law principles before the overhauls
of both systems that occurred in the current digital age. Due to
its breadth and importance, the United States’ DMCA and se-
lected landmark cases arising under it will be discussed in Part
III. Subsequently, Part IV will examine and evaluate two recent
pieces of legislation: Canada’s CMA, and the United States’ pro-
posed SOPA. Finally, Part V will conclude by discussing the ten-
sion between the nations’ copyright programs, as well as their
many interrelated facets.
Together, the statutory frameworks of the two countries are
moving toward a more obstructive model of Internet use and cop-
yright protection, which has the potential to stifle creative pro-
duction if new copyright and intellectual property regulations
are not carefully crafted. The judicial response in Canada has
nonetheless been progressive, and Canadian policies on certain
copyright elements such as fair use and statutory damages seem
to be reformist. The United States should look to Canada for
crafting comparatively reasonable provisions, such as the rela-
tively low statutory damages cap in the CMA.16 Any future leg-
islation should limit Internet service provider liability, allow
broad exceptions for fair use, and provide a robust notice-and-
notice based system of both service provider and user liability. If
15. Ariel Katz, Fair Use 2.0: The Rebirth of Fair Dealing in Canada, in THE
COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 93, 95 (Michael Geist ed., 2013).
16. The statutory damages cap is a maximum of $20,000 CAD depending on
whether the infringing use was commercial or noncommercial; to be discussed
in greater detail infra Part V. Copyright Modernization Act (Bill C–11), S.C.
2012, c. 20, s. 38 (Can.).
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new copyright regimes in either country are not properly imple-
mented, they may carry the implications of invading the rights
of citizens in both nations.
I. THE INHERENT THEORETICAL TENSION IN COPYRIGHT
The broad theoretical debate permeating the copyright law re-
gime generally concerns whom the law should seek to incentiv-
ize, and what effects a broad, far-reaching copyright regime
would have on creative production. The conflict can be summa-
rized as a policy debate: the law may serve to protect the rights
of those who have already created works, or it may allow leeway
so that inspiration may be taken from more venerated sources,
their context lending to a greater collective consciousness of cre-
ative property where artists and innovators are free to borrow
and garner inspiration from those who preceded them in their
respective fields.17 At the center of this debate is the concept of
innovation. Many scholars have spilled ink on the subject of the
impossibility to create without inspiration.18 As a classic exam-
ple goes, from where would “O Brother Where Art Thou,” “Ulys-
ses,” and “Hamlet” have come had Homer not composed the “Od-
yssey?”19 Although some elements of that classic epic poem cer-
tainly may have been copyrightable, the essence of the story is
not.20 Insofar as inspiration breeds creativity and vice versa, one
can easily come to the conclusion that no work is truly “original.”
At the heart of copyright law interpretation is the struggle be-
tween larger corporations that attempt to monitor and enforce
copyright, and the artists, authors, and users who wish to en-
17. COHEN ET AL., supra note 3.
18. See, e.g., id. at 7.
19. Id.
20. Modern North American copyright law turns on the idea/expression dis-
tinction. The basis of this theory is that any “idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery” is not protectable under
copyright law, but tangible expressions of the above may be granted protection.
U.S. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). For example, this means that a
system or organization or statistical process may not be copyright protected,
but an essay explaining precisely how to use that system would be copyright
protected as a tangible expression thereof. For more information, see, e.g.,
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879); A.A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
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courage authorship through a robust public domain of materi-
als.21 However, a concurrent tension arises between creative au-
thorship and technical innovation: “The more artistic production
is favored, the more technical innovation may be discouraged;
the administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing
the tradeoff.”22
Since it is nearly impossible to create any sort of work using
no outside inspiration, it becomes necessary for producers and
artists to use source materials in ways that encourage the users’
own creativity. In the digital era, one of the primary ways to
achieve this is through what is known as “Web 2.0,” an online
forum where users generate their own content.23 Garnering in-
spiration from materials shared online, artists and authors are
able to create content that heavily references the creative ex-
pressions that they have discovered by means of Web 2.0. In the
course of generating new material, these digital-age artists and
producers incorporate themselves within the dialogue of copy-
right by being part of the “moral economy of fair conduct in
which collective, socio-cultural benefit trumps individual
profit.”24 The communal goodmay certainly outweigh reasons for
implementation of protective measures.
The theory that creators draw inspiration from existent con-
tent goes hand-in-hand with the concept that access to and uti-
lization of digital-content networks is imperative to the funda-
mental, basic human rights concepts of modern freedoms of ex-
pression.25 There are myriad examples of how content sharing is
beneficial to creative production as a whole, allowing expressive
creative works in all forms.26 It is at times difficult, however, to
reconcile user-generated content with copyright law—even
21. Lisa Macklem, This Note’s For You—Or Is It? Copyright, Music, and the
Internet, 4 J. INT’LMEDIA&ENT. L. 249, 251 (2013).
22. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928
(2005).
23. Susanna Monseau, Fostering Web 2.0 Innovation: The Role of the Judi-
cial Interpretation of the DMCA Safe Harbor, Secondary Liability and Fair
Use, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 70, 76 (2012).
24. Martin J. Zeilinger, Chiptuning Intellectual Property: Digital Culture
Between Creative Commons and Moral Economy, 3 J. INT’L ASS’N FOR THE
STUDY OF POPULARMUSIC 19, 19 (2012).
25. Nicola Lucchi, Internet Content Governance and Human Rights, 16
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 809, 837 (2014).
26. Fraser Turnbull, TheMorality of Mash-Ups: Moral Rights and Canada’s
Non-Commercial User-Generated Content Exception, 26 I.P.J. 217, 220 (2014).
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when taking into account fair use and fair dealing exceptions,
some content is simply too close for comfort to its original source
material.27 Nonetheless, it would be impossible to argue that
works like “Kind of Bloop”28 or “Spockanalia”29 have no artistic
merit or would be copyright deficient in some respect but for ad-
vents of garnering creative inspiration in the digital age.
II. NORTH AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW BEFORE THEDIGITAL
AGE
The theoretical battle that exists between those who create,
seeking their works to be protected and monetized, versus those
who create while seeking the widest sources of inspiration in an
ever-broadening content-sharing culture is a concern in all steps
of copyright law interpretation. It is necessary for the purposes
of expounding on recent developments in both digital-age copy-
right legislation and the common law to undertake a brief survey
of both U.S. and Canadian copyright law. This Part will first ex-
amine the foundations of U.S. copyright law, which includes the
Copyright Act and relevant international treaties. It will then
briefly review the history of Canadian copyright legislation, par-
ticularly the effects of the same international law.
27. See generally Pascale Chapdelaine, The Ambiguous Nature of Copyright
Users’ Rights, 26 I.P.J. 1, 5 (2013).
28. A 2009 “chipmusic” remake of Miles Davis’ “Kind of Blue,” the seminal
jazz trumpet player’s magnum opus, “Kind of Bloop” recreated—note for note—
the original album using 8–bit electronic hardware found on the sound chips
of archaic video game hardware. Taking fair use considerations into account
and obtaining all compositional licenses necessary, the artist repurposed obso-
lete sounds and refashioned them into a “new” work that still generated con-
troversy. The artist, having reproduced the original cover art into a pixelated,
8–bit version, was sued by the original photographer and faced massive statu-
tory damages under the DMCA. For more on the DMCA, see infra Part IV. The
parties settled out of court for $32,500 USD. For more information on “Kind of
Bloop” and the controversies of chipmusic, see Andy Baio, Kind of Screwed,
WAXY (July 19, 2011), http://waxy.org/2011/06/kind_of_screwed/; Zeilinger, su-
pra note 24.
29. “Spockanalia,” first printed in 1967, is widely cited as the first-ever “fan-
zine” relating to the popular TV series “Star Trek.” For more information on
“Spockanalia” and the history of “Star Trek” fan fiction, see JOANMARIEVERBA,
BOLDLY WRITING: A TREKKER FAN AND ZINE HISTORY 1967–1987 (2003),
http://www.ftlpublications.com/bwebook.pdf.
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A. U.S. Copyright Law Foundations
U.S. copyright law has its origins30 in the Constitution itself—
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 has come to be known as the “Intel-
lectual Property Clause”: “[giving Congress the power] . . . [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”31 Post-Constitu-
tion, there have been three major statutes enacted that formed
the basis for dealing with the issue: the Copyright Acts of 1790,32
1909,33 and 1976.34 Arguably, the most significant reform of
American copyright law came in 1976, when much of the previ-
ous legislation was amended in order to keep pace with the rap-
idly expanding technology of the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury.35 Among the more noteworthy changes to the statutory
framework was a lifetime-plus fifty years36 protection period for
copyright holders, and the enumeration of specific holders’
rights.37 The 1976 Act also specified exactly what types of works
30. For more information concerning the history of U.S. copyright, see gen-
erally A Brief Introduction and History, U.S. COPYRIGHTOFF., http://www.cop-
yright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; COHEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 23.
32. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124. Congress modeled the
1790 Act on the Statute of Anne, a British act that was the first to provide for
copyright regulation by legislation, rather than private parties. See Statute of
Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
33. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23–24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080–81.
34. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (1976).
35. COHEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 26. Technology like the computer, per-
sonal printer, and VCR.
36. 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203(a)(2), 301(c), 302, 303, 304(c)(2). Congress
amended these provisions in 1998 by passing the Copyright Term Extension
Act (CTEA). Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112
Stat. 2827, 2827–28 (1998). Commonly known as the Sonny Bono Act—or more
derisively, the Mickey Mouse Protection Act, due to Disney’s extensive lobby-
ing—the CTEA extended the basic term of copyright to encompass the author’s
life and 70 years thereafter, or in the case of corporate authors, to the earlier
of 120 years after creation or 95 years after initial publication. Many authors
have criticized the CTEA as being overly limiting and protective, accusing it of
having the potential to skew the balance between rights holders and the public
domain. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106. These “exclusive rights” include reproduction, produc-
tion of derivative works, distribution, public performance and display, and pub-
lic performance by digital audiotransmission.
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are eligible for protection,38 expanding the scope of copyright
protection from solely published works to any sort of “original
works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”39
The doctrine of fair use was also codified in the 1976 Act, provid-
ing a categorical framework to be used when evaluating that de-
fense to copyright infringement.40
As far as international copyright is concerned, however, the
United States was not an original signatory to the Berne Con-
vention, a broad treaty signed in 1886, which intended to offer
multilateral protections and substantively high standards of
copyright protection for all its signatories.41 U.S. opposition to
the Berne Convention was generally based on both a reluctance
to offer protection for “moral rights,” as well as principles of “for-
malities” (such as mandatory publication of notice of copyright)
within its own existent copyright law, which the country did not
wish to reconcile with the more far-reaching provisions in the
treaty.42 Nonetheless, the United States eventually did sign on
to the Berne Convention in 1989, implementing many of its pro-
visions in the DMCA.43 The 1976 Act is the basis for current U.S.
copyright law. In concert with the rise of new technologies at
that point in the century, however, issues continued to arise con-
cerning copyright enforcement, leading toward what has been
called an “ad hoc approach” to enforcement that began to skew
in favor of copyright and intellectual property rights holders.44
38. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The Act expressly enumerated the covered works,
which includes literary, musical, dramatic, pantomime, choreographic, picto-
rial, graphic, sculptural, motion picture, sound recordings, and architectural
works.
39. Id. On a related note, for additional information on the current state of
law regarding the fixation and originality requirements, see generally Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); MAI Sys. Corp. v.
Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 107. The 1976 Act set forth a four-factor test for courts to
evaluate whether a given use fell within the fair-use exception, and those fac-
tors are as follows: the “purpose and character of the use . . . ; the nature of the
copyrighted work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the . . . work as a whole; and the effect of the use on the potential market.”
Id.
41. COHEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 35.
42. Id.
43. See infra Part IV.
44. Kevin Newman, Don’t Copy That Floppy: The IP Enforcement Dilemma
in the United States, 40 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 191, 196
(2014).
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B. Canadian Copyright Law Foundations
The original Canadian Copyright Act was enacted in 1924 (the
“1924 Act”)45 but, similar to the doctrine in the United States,
the origins of copyright law in the Canadian context date back
to the signing of its Constitution in 1867.46 The 1924 Act’s codi-
fication was the first major piece of copyright legislation in the
nation’s history47 and represented a shift away from both the
U.K.-based system48 that the country had previously been be-
holden to, and the U.S. model.49 Notably, Canada’s adherence to
the Berne Convention was presumed from the get-go: as a Com-
monwealth country, Canada was bound to the treaty when the
United Kingdom signed in 1886, and Canada specifically imple-
mented portions of the Berne Convention in 1928, during the
process of distinguishing its own legislation from British ori-
gins.50 Due to the United States’ nonparticipation in the Berne
Convention until 1989, Canada came to be at both an advantage
and a disadvantage by neighboring a non-Berne nation. Copy-
righted-content producers in Canada were afforded protections
by the Convention insofar as their rights would be recognized
internationally, but this was balanced by restricting Canadian
access to U.S. works in terms of being able to license foreign re-
prints.51
Copyright law in Canada was not amended significantly until
1988, when Bill C–88 was introduced in order to deal with
emerging issues regarding piracy, computers, and digital tech-
nology. It was meaningfully amended once again in 1996, when
Bill C-60 provided updates such as abolishing compulsory li-
cense practices for sound recordings and affording protection to
45. Jay Makarenko, Copyright Law in Canada: An Introduction to the Ca-
nadian Copyright Act, MAPLELEAFWEB (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.mapleleaf-
web.com/features/copyright-law-canada-introduction-canadian-copyright-
act#history.
46. As a matter of “greater certainty,” the Canadian Constitution enumer-
ates specific areas of law as being governed by the Federal government, as op-
posed to by the legislatures of the individual provinces. Constitution Act, 1867,
30 & 31 Vict., c. 11, § 91 (U.K.).
47. Robertson v. Thomson Corp., [2006] 2 S.C.R. 43, 68 (Can.).
48. Insofar as this was Canada’s first statute specifically dedicated to the
administration of copyright law. SeeMakarenko, supra note 45.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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choreographic works.52 At the close of the twentieth century—
just after Canada signed the World Intellectual Property Organ-
ization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty and its counterpart Perfor-
mances and Phonograms Treaty53—Canadian copyright law was
significantly amended54 to include a number of “fair dealing” ex-
emptions.55 The amendments also include many distinguishing
differences between U.S. policies and Canadian copyright prac-
tices, particularly concerning the scope of works that are pro-
tected under the current Copyright Act,56 differing stances as to
registration of copyright,57 distinct codification of moral rights,58
and an adoption of the 1961 Rome Convention in order to protect
“neighbouring rights.”59
52. Moya K. Mason, How to Trace Bill C–32 and its Legislative History,
MOYAK.COM, http://www.moyak.com/papers/tracing-government-bills.html
(last visited Nov. 16, 2014).
53. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121; WIPO Per-
formances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 203.
54. An amendment to the Canadian Copyright Act also passed in 1993 (Bill
C–88), though this earlier amendment primarily concerned clarification of the
definition of “musical works,” as well as royalty liability for certain transmit-
ters, and has been qualified as “insubstantial” by some scholars. See History of
Copyright in Canada, GOV’T OF CAN., http://can-
ada.pch.gc.ca/eng/1454685408763 (last visited May 24, 2016); see also Rose-
mary Coombe et al., Introducing Dynamic Fair Dealing: Creating Canadian
Digital Culture, in DYNAMIC FAIR DEALING: CREATING CANADIAN CULTURE
ONLINE 9 (Rosemary J. Coombe et al. eds., 2014).
55. See An Act to Amend the Copyright Act (Bill C–32), S.C. 1997, c. 21–29
(Can.).
56. In Canada, protected works must fall into one of four categories: (1) lit-
erary works, (2) dramatic works, (3) musical works, and (4) artistic works. See
Bob H. Sotiradis, A Summary of Some Distinctions Between Canadian and
American Copyright Law and Practice (Aug. 1998), http://www.robic.ca/ad-
min/pdf/584/228-BHS.pdf.
57. Registering a copyright is not necessary for protection in either country,
but in the United States registration is required in order to pursue an infringe-
ment action. Id. at 5–6.
58. The only moral rights provided for in the United States are for visual
arts under the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), whereas Canadian copyright
holders retain the ability to be protected in terms of association and integrity
rights concerning all copyrighted works. For more information on VARA, see
generally 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012); Rachel A. Camber, A Visual Art Law You
Had Better Not Overlook, FLA. B.J., May 1999, at 69.
59. Sotiradis, supra note 56, at 43–44. Neighboring rights protect publish-
ers, producers, performers, and broadcasters who do not hold stake in the di-
rect copyrighted work.
2016] Copyright Competition: Canada and the U.S. 1313
Between 1997, when Canada signed on to the WIPO Treaty,
and prior to enacting the CMA,60 Canada was described as hav-
ing a statutory framework “in which laws to address digital pi-
racy are weak, ineffective, or non-existent,”61 leading toward
Canada’s placement on the United States’ “Special 301” reports,
which identify “areas of continued concern” for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Trade in regards to piracy and “intellectual property
rights protection and enforcement.”62 While the United States
passed the DMCA in order to deal with recent technological de-
velopments, Canada’s copyright law seemed to be in need of a
complete overhaul.
III. THEDMCA: NEWMILLENNIUM, NEW TECHNOLOGIES, AND
NEW LEGISLATION
Much ink has been spilled on the DMCA. As a sweeping piece
of copyright reform legislation, the Act was the first broad effort
by the U.S. Congress to consider the implications of digital tech-
nology on copyright law. This Part will investigate both the
DMCA’s impact on anticircumvention, as well as the new safe
harbor provisions that were included in that legislation, and pro-
vide examples of relevant case law arising from the DMCA.
A. The DMCA
In 1998, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed the DMCA in
efforts to modernize U.S. copyright law,63 which had not under-
gone such significant change since the implementation of the
1976 Act. The DMCA, which implemented portions of the 1996
WIPO treaties,64 dramatically modified the 1976 Act in order to
“conform to almost every international intellectual property
60. To be discussed in greater detail infra Part IV.A.
61. Barry Sookman, Copyright Reform for Canada: What Should We Do?, 11
ONE ISSUE, TWO VOICES, Sept. 2009, at 3, 4.
62. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2014 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2014) [here-
inafter 2014 SPECIAL 301 REPORT], http://www.ustr.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/USTR%202014%20Special%20301%20Report%20to%20Congress%
20FINAL.pdf.
63. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860,
2877–86 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201–1205, 1301–
1322 (2012)); see also COHEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 661–62.
64. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 53; WIPO Performances and Pho-
nograms Treaty, supra note 53.
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treaty created since the late nineteenth century.”65 The specific
provisions of the DMCA, however, do not take verbatim the con-
tents of the WIPO treaties. The DMCA includes limitations as
reining in the Berne Convention’s66 broader definitions of pro-
tection, as well as stipulating that the provisions of the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty would only apply to mu-
sical works in the United States.67
The DMCA sought, among other objectives, to provide a frame-
work for dealing with piracy in the age of the rapidly growing
Internet.68 One of the more discussed sections of the DMCA is
the “Anti-Circumvention Provisions,”69wherein Congress explic-
itly prohibited circumvention of any technological measures
used to control access to copyrighted works.70 The statute goes
even further in restricting dissemination of such materials, in-
sofar as it prohibits any persons from participating in the “man-
ufacture, import[ing], offer[ing] to the public, provid[ing], or oth-
erwise traffic[king] in any technology, product, service, device
[or] component” that primarily serves to circumvent the afore-
mentioned technological protections.71 Statutory civil damages
for violation of the anti-circumvention provision may reach as
high as $25,000 USD,72 with criminal penalties stretching up to
$1,000,000 USD or ten years imprisonment for willful violations
65. Newman, supra note 44, at 197.
66. The Berne Convention is a prototypic international copyright treaty that
the United States did not recognize until implementation of the WIPO Trea-
ties. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
9, 1886, as revised July 24, 1971 and as amended Sept. 28, 1979, 1161 U.N.T.S.
30 (entered into force in the United States Mar. 1, 1989).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 104(d). For a more in-depth discussion on the relationship
between the WIPO Treaties and the DMCA, see COHEN ET AL., supra note 3, at
662.
68. See generally COHEN ET AL., supra note 3, at 661; David Nimmer, Appre-
ciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots of The DMCA’s Commen-
tary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (2002).
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201; see, e.g., Chamberlain Grp. v. Skylink Tech., Inc.,
381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards
in Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 537 (2005);
Herbert J. Hammond et al., The Anti-Circumvention Provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 593 (2002).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
71. Id. § 1201(b).
72. Id. § 1203(c)(3).
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with the purpose of “commercial advantage or private financial
gain.”73
Though the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions are restric-
tive—insofar as the potential liabilities for violating the Act are
severe enough to certainly deter at least some content sharers
from proliferating technologies that flout copyright protection
mechanisms—they are mitigated in no small part by a number
of enumerated exceptions. Concessions are provided for re-
searchers, minors, security testing, and government agents,
along with certain other categories of users.74 Interestingly,
there is also an exemption for “protection of personally identify-
ing information.”75 The inclusion of provisions that protect per-
sonally identifying information might suggest that the drafters
of the DMCA aimed for the statute to insulate private infringers
to some degree, allowing narrower readings of that provision.
The presence of these enumerated exceptions, as well as of safe
harbor provisions that limit liability of the content provider for
supplying copyright-protected information so long as the discre-
tion of users is involved,76 has led some authors to consider that
“harsh enforcement is not the aim of the legislation.”77 However,
there has been strong critical backlash against the DMCA.78 Alt-
hough many provisions of the DMCA were “initially intended to
curb mass copying,”79 the potential for abuse and even for un-
necessary censorship is great, enough for some to fear a chilling
effect on innovation due to the broad amount of control that
might be exerted upon users of information systems.80 In the last
decade and a half, scholars, legislators, and lawyers have failed
to come to a uniform consensus on ways to interpret the DMCA
in a manner that is effective in both protecting users’ rights as
well as a robust public domain.81 Since the DMCA was enacted,
73. Id. § 1204.
74. Id. § 1201(d)–(j).
75. Id. § 1201(i).
76. See id. § 512.
77. Newman, supra note 44, at 198.
78. See, e.g., Amy E. McCall, The DMCA and Researchers’ First Amendment
Rights, 3 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1 (2002).
79. JOANNA DEMERS, STEAL THIS MUSIC: HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
AFFECTSMUSICAL CREATIVITY 8 (2006).
80. Macklem, supra note 21, at 269.
81. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggre-
gating Fair Use from the DMCA’s Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 111 (2005).
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numerous cases arising under that statute have been instructive
in interpreting its more controversial elements.
B. The DMCA Cases
The following three cases were notable explications of DMCA
jurisprudence—and naturally, the rulings have been fraught
with controversy. The speed of advancing technology coupled
with a statutory framework allowing broad interpretation has
provided for sometimes unpredictable results in cases that arise
under the DMCA.
1. Viacom v. YouTube
In terms of establishing concrete notions of contributory liabil-
ity as pertaining to digital content providers, Viacom v.
YouTube82 provides extremely important insight into current in-
terpretations of the DMCA safe harbor provisions. The media
conglomerate Viacom filed suit against YouTube, alleging that
the online video content service had engaged in copyright in-
fringement by allowing its users to both view and upload copy-
right-protected materials.83 The District Court granted sum-
mary judgment to YouTube on the theory that YouTube could
not have satisfied the DMCA’s requirement84 that the service
provider had to have been on notice and had “the right and abil-
ity to control” the infringing activity in question.85 On appeal to
the Second Circuit, the District Court’s determination regarding
the safe harbor provision of the DMCA was reversed. Instead of
the lower court’s interpretation that “item-specific knowledge”
prompted the inquiry into YouTube’s “right and ability to con-
trol” the material,86 the Second Circuit panel went a step fur-
ther. The Second Circuit panel held that there needed to be fur-
ther inquiry into YouTube’s “ability to remove or block access to
materials posted on [its] website,”87 and remanded the case, in-
structing the District Court to determine whether or not
82. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
83. Id.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2012).
85. Viacom Int’l v. YouTube Int’l, 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527–29 (S.D.N.Y.
2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir 2012).
86. Viacom, 676 F.3d at 36.
87. Id. at 38.
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YouTube was aware of “something more” than the ability to con-
trol, remove, or deny access to the protected material in ques-
tion.88
Though the case later settled out of court, Viacom is instruc-
tive in determining that fact-specific inquiries are necessary to
determine the scope of copyright infringement as it relates to
service providers. This case provides a good benchmark and in-
dication that it will be difficult in the future for providers to
neatly fit into a category of safe harbor protection.89 “Something
more” than the right and ability to control, however, remains
both a vague and definition-less standard. It seems that in the
DMCA age, due to the fact that the onus is largely on the users
of the websites to self-police, and that there is no automatic sec-
ondary liability for the service provider, Viacom will stand as a
case that strikes a balance between the theoretical models of free
content dissemination and copyright holders’ entitlements.
2. Ouellette v. Viacom
Ouellette90 is unique in DMCA jurisprudence. After the plain-
tiff’s videos were removed from YouTube after it was notified of
potentially copyright-infringing material by Viacom, Ouellette
sued Viacom under the DMCA’s section 512(f), which details
that any knowing misrepresentations relating to infringing ma-
terials, or materials removed (or alternatively, “taken down”) by
the content host are actionable.91 The court, after determining
that the proper notice-and-takedown procedure was followed,92
noted that there is a “high standard” for a section 512(f) claim,
which must involve a subjective determination of whether the
takedown notice was issued “in good faith.”93 Ouellette’s claim
was dismissed on the grounds that he did not plead facts at the
88. Id.
89. Brett M. Jackson, Comment, Searching for “Something More”: Viacom
Interprets the Control Provision of The DMCA §512(C) Safe Harbor, 54 B.C. L.
REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 85, 93–94 (2013).
90. Ouellette v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., No. CV–10–133–M–DWM–JCL, 2012
WL1435703 (D. Mont. 2011).
91. Id. at *1–2; 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2012).
92. Whereupon the copyright holder informs the content host of infringing
activity, after which the host removes the infringing material.
93. Ouellette, 2012 WL1435703, at *3–4.
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outset of his argument that were sufficient to establish that Via-
com acted in bad faith.94
In terms of analyzing Ouellette alongside recent developments
in Canadian copyright law, the case may stand for the proposi-
tion that the notice-and-takedown provision of the DMCA95 is
too broad, at least when it comes to misrepresentation. Because
Ouellette had such a high standard to reach in pleading his
claim, it seems that it would have been per se impossible for him
to establish any kind of bad faith on Viacom’s part before the
videos at issue were taken down. The Canadian notice-and-no-
tice solution96 might have the potential to afford a plaintiff like
Ouellette the opportunity to inquire in greater detail as to the
strength of his claim before resorting to litigation. 97
3. Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum
A further concern with the provisions of the DMCA is that the
statutory damages imposed for infringement have the potential
to be enormous. In addition to the $1,000,000 penalties possible
for criminal infringement of the anti-circumvention provisions,98
provisions are built into the “Remedies” section of the Act that
allow parties infringed upon to recoup statutory damages, at a
minimum of $750 and maximum of $30,000 per instance of in-
fringement.99 That figure rises to a maximum of $150,000 per
instance of infringement if such infringement is proven to have
been willful.100 These elements of the DMCA were at the heart
94. Id. Viacom allegedly acted in bad faith because it used a technological
scanning device in attempt to identify potentially infringing videos, rather
than specific searches for the content at question. Therefore, the notice portion
of the DMCA provisions was defective.
95. Notice-and-takedown is the DMCA-outlined process by which a content
owner provides the Internet service provider with good-faith notice of poten-
tially infringing material posted by a third party, whereupon the provider
promptly must “take down” the material.
96. In which the copyright holder notifies the provider, who then notifies
the user that he or she must remove the infringing material. SeeMichael Geist,
The Effectiveness of Notice and Notice (Feb. 15, 2007),
http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/1705/125/.
97. For a more detailed argument in favor of a Canadian notice-and-
takedown regime, as well as a counterargument for a notice-and-notice based
system, see Sookman, supra note 61, at 8–9.
98. See infra Part IV.
99. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
100. Id.
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of a 2010 decision that dealt with the unfortunate example of a
major recording company taking action against a student for
willful infringement of copyright.101
In Sony BMGMusic Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, the defend-
ant admitted to using computer programs to download and share
songs copyrighted and owned by Sony BMG. Thirty particular
recordings were in question in the action.102 Plaintiffs sought
statutory damages instead of actual damages as a remedy in this
suit, and the jury awarded $22,500 per song, adding up to a total
of $675,000.103 Tenenbaum challenged the award under the due
process clause, arguing that such damages were excessive and
disproportionate to the harm suffered by the plaintiffs.104 Tenen-
baum was successful in the District Court, where the judge re-
duced the damages to $67,500 after taking into account calcula-
tions such as the online market prices for the downloads.105
Judge Gertner reasoned that the legitimate government interest
in preventing illegal file sharing over the Internet was entirely
disproportionate to the massive statutory award granted by the
jury.106 On appeal to the First Circuit, however, the original
award was reinstated. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Dis-
trict Court should not have decided the constitutionality of the
jury award before considering the doctrine of remittitur.107
Therein, the actual constitutionality of the award was not really
considered on its merits by the appellate court.
Tenenbaum stands for the proposition that imposing statutory
damages for proven willful copyright infringement are valid, yet
at the same time, have great potential to violate considerations
of due process. Though the DMCA sought overall to modernize
U.S. copyright law, cases like Viacom, Oulette, and Tenenbaum
illustrate the difficulties, moral dilemmas, and room for error in
interpreting its many subsections. The Act has been criticized
from a number of angles. Nevertheless,108 since technology is not
101. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D. Mass
2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 660 F.3d 487, 509 (1st Cir. 2011).
102. Id. at 87.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 91.
105. Id. at 101, 117–18.
106. Id. at 121.
107. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 509 (1st Cir.
2011). Remittitur is the process by which a judge may lower jury-imposed dam-
ages in civil actions.
108. See, e.g., Schaffner, supra note 2.
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static, the law must adapt, and consequently both the Canadian
and U.S. governments came to craft further updated statutes
that came to fruition in 2012.
IV. NEW FRONTIERS: THE CMA AND SOPA
In the aftermath of the DMCA and its resulting litigation, both
Canada and the United States contemplated additional copy-
right reforms. Though only the Canadian bill has become law,
the influence of both the CMA and SOPA have been pervasive
and controversial in recent years. This Part will review the dig-
ital locks and notice-and-notice provisions of the CMA, as well
as Canada Supreme Court decisions handed down after the
CMA. It will move on to a critique of SOPA’s restrictive provi-
sions. It is apparent that the two pieces of legislation track each
other in many ways, generally leading to less user-friendly cop-
yright doctrines in both countries.
A. The CMA: A “Canadian-Bred” Solution
The CMA was Canada’s long-debated response to the DMCA
and a carefully crafted response in compliance to the WIPO trea-
ties.109 The legislation incorporates many modifications to Can-
ada’s Copyright Act,110 the most relevant being the digital-locks
provisions and the notice-and-notice provision, along with its cap
on statutory damages.
1. Canadian Digital Locks
Of particular controversy in the CMA are the provisions re-
garding digital locks.111 According to the Canadian government’s
official “Balanced Copyright” information, the new legislation
“makes it illegal to circumvent or bypass technology . . . used to
prevent unauthorized access to copyrighted material.”112 At first
blush, this language seems analogous to the DMCA. Upon closer
inspection, however, the unique nature of the Canadian law
comes to light.
109. Copyright Modernization Act (Bill C–11), S.C. 2012, c. 20, pmbl. (Can.).
110. Canada’s copyright act was last substantially amended in 1997 with Bill
C–32. See supra Part III.B.
111. Copyright Modernization Act (Bill C–11), S.C. 2012, c. 20, s. 41 (Can.).
112. What the Copyright Modernization Act Says About Digital Locks, GOV’T
OF CAN., http://balancedcopyright.gc.ca/eic/site/crp-prda.nsf/eng/rp01182.html
(last visited May 26, 2016); Geist, supra note 96.
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To briefly recap the U.S. legislation for the sake of comparison,
the DMCA’s anti-circumvention provisions give rise to liability
for individuals who circumvent access controls to copyrighted
materials,113 as well as liability for individuals who make or sell
devices that either circumvent such access controls,114 or allow
users to circumvent access controls in order to exercise exclusive
rights granted to copyright owners.115 That statute did not go so
far as to incorporate a provision that bans circumvention of ac-
cess controls designed to prevent exclusive right violations.
Therefore, according to the DMCA, it would not be illegal, for
example, for a user to circumvent a digital lock designed to allow
reproduction of a copyrighted work.
As far as the Canadian Copyright Act is concerned in the post-
CMA era, circumvention of technological protection measures is
a direct copyright infringement in its own right. There does not
need to be a second step or an “underlying infringement” in order
to for a violation to occur.116 Circumvention without an underly-
ing infringement may give rise to a legal claim. This provision is
restrictive because it criminalizes the first step in infringement,
rather than the actual infringement itself.117 At the time the
CMA was introduced, its digital-locks provisions caused outrage
among many Canadian lawmakers118 and scholars,119 and have
since remained some of the most contentious elements of the leg-
islation.
2. Notice-and-Notice and User-Generated Content
The notice-and-notice provision of the CMA has been described
as a “Canadian-bred solution”120 to the issue of how to properly
provide Internet service providers and websites with an appro-
priate scheme for dealing with potential copyright violations. As
113. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2012).
114. Id. § 1201(a)(2).
115. Id. § 1201(b).
116. Copyright Modernization Act (Bill C–11), S.C. 2012, c. 20, s. 41.1 (Can.).
117. Chapdelaine, supra note 27, at *21.
118. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl., 1st Sess.,
Vol. 134, No. 34 (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.parl.gc.ca/con-
tent/hoc/House/411/Debates/034/HAN034-E.pdf.
119. Carys Craig, Locking Out Lawful Users: Fair Dealing and Anti-Circum-
vention in Bill C-32, in FROM “RADICALEXTREMISM” TO “BALANCEDCOPYRIGHT”:
CANADIAN COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL AGENDA 177, 198 (Michael Geist ed.,
2010).
120. See, e.g., Geist, supra note 96.
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opposed to the DMCA model,121 the Canadian model requires
owners of copyrighted material who discover infringing uses or
infringement to notify the appropriate Internet service provider,
who then has the onus to both forward the notice to the infring-
ing user and monitor that user’s online activities for a period of
time afterward.122 This allows a prima facie intermediary period
wherein users’ rights are not immediately impinged upon; due
process is generally accepted to be better protected by such a
system where the user has an opportunity to remove the content
him or herself before litigation or other consequences may com-
mence.123Notice-and-notice, unlike the relatively restrictive dig-
ital-locks provisions of the CMA, has garnered support from the
online community, with some of Canada’s leading copyright and
privacy scholars arguing that the system does an adequate job
balancing the interests of the copyright holders as well as those
of the content owners.124Nonetheless, the strategy is not without
critics, who argue that the U.S. notice-and-takedown strategy is
“necessary” to regulate files that are hosted by the Internet ser-
vice providers at issue.125
Though the CMA has still been criticized as a restrictive piece
of legislation,126 the Act has incorporated other progressive ele-
ments, particularly in the realm of user-generated content.127
Section 29.21 of the amended Canadian Copyright Act (post-
CMA) codifies an exception for individuals to utilize—without
necessarily obtaining permission from the owners—copyright-
protected works when creating a new work, so long as that new
work satisfies a number of qualifications.128 Notably, one of the
121. Wherein Internet service providers must directly “take down” poten-
tially infringing content posted by users upon proper notice by copyright own-
ers. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(a)(iii) (2012); Liliana Cheng, The Red
Flag Test for Apparent Knowledge Under the DMCA §512(C) Safe Harbor, 28
CARDOZOARTS&ENT. L.J. 195 (2010).
122. Copyright Modernization Act (Bill C–11), S.C. 2012, c. 20, s. 41.25–26
(Can.).
123. Nathan Irving, Copyright Law for the Digital World: An Evaluation of
Reform Proposals, 10 ASPERREV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 141, 159 (2010).
124. See, e.g., Geist, supra note 96; Michael Geist, Canada’s Digital Economy
Strategy: Towards an Openness Framework, 8 CAN. J. L. & TECH. 275 (2010).
125. Sookman, supra note 61.
126. See, e.g., Chapdelaine, supra note 27.
127. Online content created by users such as fan-fiction or YouTube videos.
See supra Part II.
128. Copyright Modernization Act (Bill C–11), S.C. 2012, c. 20, s. 21.29
(Can.).
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criteria is that the new work must be used solely for noncom-
mercial purposes.129 The exception has been characterized as
“unprecedented.”130 The potential effect of the user-generated
content exception cannot be understated. In terms of generating
content for personal websites, blogs, and other not-for-profit con-
siderations, the CMA has considerably loosened the restraints
on content creators. The number of factors that must be satisfied
before the exception actually kicks in, however, may prove to
limit its practical application.131 Nonetheless, this specific provi-
sion of the CMA substantially advances the Canadian model in-
sofar as it has clearly taken care to attempt reformation of one
of the issues that has been the most contentious in U.S. copy-
right litigation post-DMCA.132
3. The Copyright Pentalogy and its Implications
On July 12, 2012—just two weeks after the CMA received
royal assent133—the Supreme Court of Canada handed down five
separate copyright-related decisions, an unprecedented move
given that the Court rarely chooses to hear copyright cases.134
The cases have been termed “the Copyright Pentalogy” by Dr.
Michael Geist,135 widely renowned as one of Canada’s leading
experts on copyright law.136 Though the Court spoke on four dis-
tinct issues, the two cases that consider fair dealing as a primary
issue are particularly relevant.137 Though functionally equiva-
lent to the U.S. doctrine of fair use insofar as it is an affirmative
129. The other provisions are that the new work gives attribution to the orig-
inal author, uses a noninfringing copy in creating the new work, and does not
have an adverse effect on the original.
130. Turnbull, supra note 26, at 222.
131. See, e.g., Chapdelaine, supra note 27.
132. See, e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
133. Copyright Modernization Act (Bill C–11), S.C. 2012, c. 20, pmbl. (Can.).
134. Michael Geist, Introduction, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT
LAW iii (Michael Geist ed., 2013).
135. Id.
136. See Michael A. Geist, CAN. RES. CHAIRS (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://www.chairs-chaires.gc.ca/chairholders-titulaires/profile-eng.aspx?pro-
fileId=840.
137. The other three cases have to do with (1) the meaning of the word “com-
municate” in the context of “public telecommunication” in the Canadian Copy-
right Act (Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music
Publishers of Can., [2012] 2 S.C.R. 231 (Can.)); (2) the meaning of the phrase
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defense to copyright infringement,138 fair dealing nonetheless
differs primarily because the doctrine requires the use to be one
of five specifically enumerated categories: “research, private
study, education, parody, or satire.”139 A two-step process is used
to find fair dealing; the work must first fit into one of the enu-
merated categories and, only after a determination as such, it
must be assessed whether the dealing was fair or not.140
In Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Can-
ada (SOCAN) v. Bell, the Supreme Court of Canada decided
unanimously that listening to snippets of musical compositions
on music purchasing software services (such as iTunes) qualifies
as research and is permissible under Canadian standards of fair
dealing.141 Analysts have pointed to the fact that in arriving at
its holding in Bell, the Court both lowers the required threshold
for an act to qualify as research142 and takes a “balanced ap-
proach” to the fair dealing concept, wherein the use is expanded
from the country’s previous approach, but still does not reach as
wide as the United States’ latitude in fair use.143 Ostensibly, the
defense is marginally narrower than the U.S. model because
there still remains (at least as far as the text of the statue is
concerned) the primary step of fitting the use into one of the pre-
scribed categories. Nonetheless, Bell can be seen not only as a
clarification of fair dealing standards in the digital age, but also
as an example of the Court taking a firm stance in favor of users
rights, leading critics to evince a more advantageous balance of
rights for copyright consumers rather than creators.144
“to the public” in the same section of the Act (Rogers Commc’ns Inc. v. Soc’y of
Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Can., [2012] 2 S.C.R. 283 (Can.));
and (3) interpretation of the word “sound recording” in the context of synchro-
nization to video, in film soundtracks, for example (Re:Sound v. Motion Picture
Theatre Ass’ns of Can., [2012] 2 S.C.R. 376 (Can.)). For more information, see
Cameron J. Hutchinson, The 2012 Supreme Court Copyright Decisions & Tech-
nological Neutrality, 46 U.B.C. L. REV. 589 (2013).
138. For the four U.S. fair use factors, see supra note 40.
139. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C–42, s. 29 (Can.). The secondary work
must also adequately cite the source material, following the explicit terms of
the statute. Id. s. 29.1–2.
140. Iona Harding, Five Decisions in One Day: The Supreme Court of Canada
Takes on Copyright Law, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 59, 64 (2013).
141. Soc’y of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Can. v. Bell Can.,
[2012] 2 S.C.R. 326, at paras. 6, 13, 20–25, 28 (Can.).
142. Hutchinson, supra note 137, at 606.
143. Harding, supra note 140, at 65.
144. Hutchinson, supra note 137, at 603–06.
2016] Copyright Competition: Canada and the U.S. 1325
Similarly to Bell, the Supreme Court in Alberta (Minister of
Education) v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access
Copyright)145 interpreted the fair dealing provisions of the Cop-
yright Act. However, the particular element focused on was that
of “private study”: the Court had to decide the standard of copy-
right liability arising when teachers supplied their students
with photocopies of textbooks and other educational materi-
als.146 Focusing on the fact that purchasing hard-copy textbooks
for each individual student was not a reasonable alternative to
photocopies, the Court ultimately held that when teachers pro-
vide students with photocopies of excerpts from books and text-
books for class, they facilitate the “private study” of students.147
Again, the standard of what is allowable under fair dealing was
broadened—analogously to Bell, post-Alberta (Education), there
is a “low threshold” to attain as far as the five enumerated cate-
gories of fair dealing are concerned.148
Perhaps, both Bell and Alberta (Education)—possibly, the
whole pentalogy—reflect an attempt by the Supreme Court of
Canada to broaden the more restrictive copyright goals ad-
vanced in the CMA. Characterized as “liberal, consumer-
friendly”149 approaches to copyright reform, the pentalogy deci-
sions relating to fair use represent a move toward a more user-
based copyright economy. In the wake of the CMA, it seems as
though the standards for clarification of Canadian copyright law
have ample potential to grow much broader, at least in terms of
judicial interpretation. An interesting wrinkle to the situation
could be that the Supreme Court has tended to lean liberal in
recent years, frequently deciding against the Conservative gov-
ernment, even with its parliamentary majority that has been in
place since 2011.150 There is even a possible argument for the
145. Alberta (Minister of Education) v. Can. Copyright Licensing Agency (Ac-
cess Copyright), [2012] 2 S.C.R. 345, at para. 1 (Can.).
146. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C–42, s. 29 (Can.).
147. Alberta (Minister of Education), 2 S.C.R. 345 at para. 23. Justice Abella
noted that “private” does not necessarily mean “in isolation,” rather, the con-
cepts of studying and learning are “essentially personal endeavours.” Id. at
para. 27.
148. Samuel E. Trosow, Fair Dealing Practices in the Post-Secondary Educa-
tion Sector After the Pentalogy, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT
LAW 213, 224 (Michael Geist ed., 2013).
149. Harding, supra note 140, at 67.
150. See Map of Official Results for the 41st General Election, supra note 11.
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Court actively attempting to restrain the conservative federal
government. The Court has sided against the recently-departed
Harper administration on many issues;151 theoretically, whether
the Supreme Court (or any court, for that matter) leans con-
servative or liberal should not be a factor when considering ju-
dicial impartiality, but decisive votes certainly would sway stat-
utory interpretation in either direction—notably here, in the
context of copyright.152 It seems that in the wake of the CMA and
the copyright pentalogy decisions, judicial interpretation of re-
cent restrictive copyright legislation is providing a path in Can-
ada toward broadening the exceptions to the rules. The impact
of the late 2015 majority election of Liberal-party Prime Minis-
ter Justin Trudeau,153 however, has yet to be realized in the area
of copyright: Canada could still be facing major changes in the
near future with respect to many areas of legislative reform.
B. SOPA: A Disproportionate Response to Infringement?
In 2011, after much anticipation, the controversial intellectual
property bills SOPA and PIPA were introduced, respectively, to
the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate.154 Though the
proposed statutes were “essentially, two versions of the same
anti-piracy bill,” this Note focuses on SOPA.155 SOPA’s stated
purpose was to “promote prosperity, creativity, entrepreneur-
ship, and innovation by combating the theft of U.S. property,”156
151. For a more in-depth discussion of the unique ongoing tension in recent
years between the Harper administration and the Supreme Court of Canada,
see Priya Sarin, Harper Takes a Swing at the Supreme Court After Losing Yet
Another Case, RABBLE.CA (May 27, 2014), http://rabble.ca/column-
ists/2014/05/harper-takes-swing-supreme-court-after-losing-yet-another-case.
152. SeeMargaret Ann Wilkinson, The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copy-
right Cases, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 71 (Michael
Geist ed., 2013).
153. Ian Austen, In Canada, Stunning Rout by Trudeau, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2015, at A1.
154. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Preventing Real
Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act
of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011).
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ferently in each house of government. See Andrew Couts, SOPA vs. PIPA: Anti-
Piracy Bills, Uproar Explained, DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 16, 2012),
http://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/sopa-vs-pipa-anti-piracy-bills-up-
roar-explained/.
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which was given a chilly reception by the greater online commu-
nity.157 Primarily, a contentious point of SOPA was the section
designed to “protect U.S. customers” by making websites that
are “dedicated to theft of U.S. property” illegal.158 The statute’s
definition of these websites is quite broad in the sense that the
statute may act in a way that would sweep in many sites that
play no direct role whatsoever in the distribution of pirated con-
tent. SOPA designates an illicit site as one that “is marketed by
its operator or another . . . for use in, [or for] offering goods or
services in a manner that engages in, enables, or facilitates” any
one of a number of forms of copyright infringement as defined in
the Copyright Act.159 The potential implications of implementing
such an expansive provision are vast.
By creating such a far-reaching basis for finding copyright in-
fringement, SOPA, as originally drafted, would allow legal ac-
tion to be taken against conscious copyright infringers (for ex-
ample, the direct-download and streaming website Megaupload
before it was shut down160 or a torrent-based client website like
The Pirate Bay161), in addition to websites that merely aid users
in infringement (for example, a service like the website “Watch
Series Online,”162 where the site in particular does not directly
host any infringing content, but does provide the user with a
bevy of links to tertiary websites that host the infringing con-
tent). The implications to this “facilitate” language, however, are
tremendously concerning. If the logic is followed to the extreme,
any search engine would be considered illegal under SOPA be-
cause a link (to a link, to another link, and so on) would eventu-
ally lead to a website providing infringing content, no matter
how attenuated the connection.
157. Wortham, supra note 4.
158. H.R. 3261 § 103(a)(1)(B).
159. Id.
160. For more information on the Megaupload case, see United States of
America v. Dotcom, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148114 (E.D.Va Oct. 5, 2012) (Trial
Pleading).
161. PIRATE BAY, http://piratebay.org (last visited May 27, 2016). For more
information on the U.S. legal system’s “inadequacy in dealing with issues pre-
sented by The Pirate Bay,” see Tara Touloumis, Comment, Buccaneers and
Bucks From the Internet: Pirate Bay and the Entertainment Industry, 19 SETON
HALL J. SPORTS&ENT. L. 253 (2009).
162. WATCH SERIES ONLINE, http://watchserieshd.eu (last visited Oct. 7,
2014).
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For example, a Google search might turn up aNew York Times
article that contains links to websites that compile popular
blogs. That site would in turn link to a particular blog itself, that
blog linking again to another user’s website, where a link from
there to Watch Series Online, and lastly to another party might
lead finally to infringing content. Every step in the chain has the
potential to be liable for infringement under SOPA. It has been
suggested that “[t]he core functionality of nearly every Internet
website that involves user-generated content enables and facili-
tates infringement . . . . The entire Internet itself” could there-
fore satisfy SOPA’s standards of copyright infringement.163 This
particular provision of SOPA gives the Act a particularly “slip-
pery slope” feel; it seems that the drafters of the bill sought to
push the limits of exactly how far-reaching enforcement could
be, whether consciously or not.
The details of SOPA concerning the measures that Internet
service providers must take to prevent illicit content are equally
nonspecific in their scope. If a website is found to be displaying
infringing content or “facilitating” the access of infringing con-
tent, the service provider must take “technically feasible and
reasonable measures designed to prevent access by its subscrib-
ers” to foreign-based infringing content.164 Regardless of
whether or not the provision has noble purposes at its heart (pre-
sumably, to protect the domain of copyright holders), it is ulti-
mately vague. “Technically feasible measures” could be an ex-
tremely slippery term that would necessarily lead to case-by-
case, fact-specific inquiries that have the potential to both bog
down the ostensible intended purpose of securing rights, as well
as weigh heavily on courts to determine what measures might
be coherently feasible, what may be perhaps unnecessary, and
what may even be overbroad in the event of disputes.
A difficult question develops: What is the exact burden that a
website must bear to block access to foreign infringers, and must
it bear that burden even if the links are so attenuated that mul-
tiple clicks lie within the paths of the two? Again, in the case of
a search engine, or a link-rich, non-U.S.-specific website like Fa-
163. Mike Masnick, The Definitive Post On Why SOPA and Protect IP Are
Bad, Bad Ideas, TECHDIRT (Nov. 22, 2011, 11:55 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20111122/04254316872/definitive-post-why-
sopa-protect-ip-are-bad-bad-ideas.shtml.
164. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 102(c)(2)(A)(i) (2011).
2016] Copyright Competition: Canada and the U.S. 1329
cebook or Twitter, the actual process of taking these “reasona-
ble” measures might not seem so reasonable after all when the
costs of operating any kind of foreign-reaching site would be out-
weighed by the responsibility to block access to so much content.
Leading copyright scholars have suggested that requirements
like the “technically feasible” language in that section of SOPA
would unjustly burden websites that “have a tangential relation-
ship to infringement but play an important role in the Internet
economy.”165 It is inherently unjust for Internet service provid-
ers to bear the burden of policing users’ browsing, sharing, and
streaming habits. Even if the technology were in place for the
providers to easily monitor infringing activities, SOPA would
“upset the balance struck by existing digital copyright and chill
the growth of social media sites that foster free expression.”166
Unsurprisingly, due to its restrictive nature, the online re-
sponse to SOPA was cold.167 Research suggests there had never
previously been such a large-scale Internet protest prior to the
House of Representatives’ consideration of the bill in 2011.168
Across the Internet, SOPA’s many detractors shut down web-
sites in objection to the bill, including the well-known Wikipedia
blackout on January 18, 2012.169 The potential chilling effects
that SOPA can impose on the principle of worldwide, cross-bor-
der sharing and dissemination of information––arguably, one of
the central tenets of the Internet in general––would be negated,
or at the very least, severely compromised by restrictive inter-
pretations of the statue across all of the United States’ jurisdic-
165. Michael A. Carrier, SOPA, PIPA, ACTA, TPP: An Alphabet Soup of In-
novation-Stifling Copyright Legislation and Agreements, 11 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 21, 22 (2013).
166. Anna S. Han, Comment, Argh, Matey! The Faux-Pas of the SOPA, 45 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM CAVEAT 45, 48 (2012).
167. Wortham, supra note 4.
168. See H.R. 3261.
169. Deborah Netburn, Wikipedia: SOPA Protest Led 8 Million to Look Up
Reps in Congress, L.A. TIMES: TECH. (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2012/01/wikipedia-sopa-blackout-
congressional-representatives.html.
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tions. Though the legislation was tabled shortly thereafter, ne-
gotiations to reintroduce the bill have been ongoing since SOPA’s
introduction.170
V. LOOKING AHEAD: THE CANADA-U.S. TENSION
After the back-and-forth between the passing of the DMCA
and the CMA, and the controversial proposal of SOPA, there still
are distinct tenets in the laws—the laws enacted and those that
merely were proposed—that continue to sit uncomfortably in the
complex relationship between the United States and Canada. If
the CMA was, in fact, a response to the DMCA, intended to bring
Canada into the “Internet age,”171 it seems to have fallen short
in some respects—at least according to SOPA’s stringent stand-
ards.
The tension between Canadian and U.S. copyright regimes
dates back to the nineteenth century. Long before the advent of
computers and of P2P technology, and just a mere thirty years
after the invention of the first-ever commercially marketed type-
writer,172 the New York Times published an article that com-
plained of “Canadian pirates” disseminating illegal copies of
popular music of the day.173 Of course, in 1897, the sheet music
versions of popular music were at issue, as opposed to the cur-
rent difficulties in regulating illegal downloads. These early in-
fringing copies were sold at just 10 percent of the market rate
for compositions through an ingenious scheme where a newspa-
per publisher would advertise a list of compositions. The pro-
spective purchaser was able to pay per composition, and the roy-
alties—instead of being sent to the true publisher of the compo-
sition—would be split between the newspaper (for advertising
space) and the “pirate.”174 Though technology since that time has
170. Paul Kane, SOPA, PIPA Votes to be Delayed in House and Senate, WASH.
POST: POL. (Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2cham-
bers/post/sopa-senate-vote-to-be-delayed-reid-an-
nounces/2012/01/20/gIQApRWVDQ_blog.html.
171. Kevin P. Siu, Technological Neutrality: Toward Copyright Convergence
in the Digital Age, 71 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV., Spring 2013, at 76, 78.
172. Mary Bellis, Typewriters, ABOUT: MONEY, http://inven-
tors.about.com/od/tstartinventions/a/Typewriters.htm (last updated Dec. 16,
2014).
173. Jared Moya,Music Industry Angry Over Piracy From…1897?, ZEROPAID
(May 1, 2009), http://www.zeropaid.com/news/86135/pic-music-industry-an-
gry-over-piracy-from1897/.
174. Id.
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certainly undergone dramatic changes, the primary issue re-
mains substantially similar: it seems that the United States’ up-
stairs neighbor is perceived as a haven for media and infor-
mation pirates, providing an easy space where rampant dissem-
ination of copyright-protected materials is the norm.
Annually, the U.S. Department of Trade publishes a “Special
301 Report” aimed at a broad review of intellectual property re-
gimes, protection, and enforcement globally; in certain years
there is a discrete focus on the “continuing challenges of copy-
right piracy.”175 In 2012, Canada was placed on the “Priority
Watch List,” alongside countries such as China, Russia, and In-
dia.176 The report criticized Canada for not fully addressing In-
ternet piracy, among other issues such as border enforcement
and trademark limitations.177 The United States was not alone
in condemning Canada’s copyright framework; the European
Union was concerned about Canada’s “crucial weaknesses” as
well.178 Though it may have seemed incongruous that a nation
with a well-developed history of intellectual property rights pro-
tection would have ended up on that list,179 as of the writing of
the report, Canada had not yet implemented the WIPO Copy-
right Treaties180 that gave rise to the DMCA.
After the CMA passed in the Canadian legislature—but before
that bill was signed into law—the 2013 Special 301 Report re-
moved Canada from its “Priority Watch List,” adding the coun-
try simply to its “Watch List,” “welcoming” the passage of the
CMA.181 Though the subsequent 2014 Report kept Canada on
the Watch List,182 the language used in the report was decidedly
warier of the nation’s practices: “The United States urges Can-
ada to implement its WIPO Internet Treaties commitments in a
manner consistent with its international obligations and to con-
tinue to address the challenges of copyright piracy in the digital
age.”183 Furthermore, the report noted that Canada engaged in
175. 2012 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
176. Id. at 25–26.
177. Id.
178. Sookman, supra note 61, at 4.
179. See supra Part III.B.
180. Id.
181. OFFICE OF THEU.S. TRADE REP., 2013 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 10, 46 (2013),
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/05012013%202013%20Spe-
cial%20301%20Report.pdf.
182. 2014 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 62, at 49.
183. Id.
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“commercial-scale [intellectual property rights] infringement,”
both by means of websites hosted in Canada and users based in
the country as well.184
There is clearly a concern on the part of the U.S. Department
of Trade regarding adequate rights protection in Canada, but it
has been argued that Canada’s copyright protection regime
(even pre-CMA) was sufficiently strict; in some cases even more
severe than the United States’.185 Though the fear of interna-
tional copyright piracy is certainly valid in many respects,
stricter developments in copyright legislation like the CMA’s
provisions having to do with digital locks and the circumvention
of technological measures intended to protect copyrighted mate-
rial will serve to assuage U.S. concerns that Canada will become
a piracy haven. In fact, taking into account the relatively strong
provisions in the CMA in conjunction with the restrictive nature
of the failed SOPA legislation, it is continually becoming more
and more clear that each country is taking steps to safeguard
against any piracy whatsoever, and at the same time, curbing
the efforts of creative producers that rely upon content-sharing
to create their works.
In many ways, current Canadian legislation has grown to re-
semble an even more restrictive version of the controversial
DMCA. The CMA’s provisions on anti-circumvention—the digi-
tal locks section—have become renowned for their restrictive na-
ture.186 Though SOPA was criticized for its harshness on many
levels, the proposed statute did not incorporate any provisions
that went as far as the CMA’s policy of not necessitating an un-
derlying exclusive right infringement in order to find copyright
infringement upon circumvention of technological protection
measures.187 Even though both enacted statutes set out numer-
ous exceptions to liability based on different circumstances such
184. Id. at 21.
185. Howard A. Knopf, Why Canadian Copyright Law is Already Stronger
and Better than that of the USA—AndWhy the USA Should Look in theMirror
Rather than at its “Special 301” Watch List (2008), at 1–3, 5–6, http://ford-
hamipconference.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Howard-Knof_canadian-
copyright.pdf.
186. See Gregory R. Hagen, Technological Neutrality in Canadian Copyright
Law, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 307, 323–26 (Michael
Geist ed., 2013).
187. See supra Part IV.A.
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as for researchers, minors, security testing,188 and for interoper-
ability, or encryption research,189 it is safe to say that the Cana-
dian legislation goes farther than the U.S. model as far as the
floor for liability is concerned. Perhaps, the anxieties that the
U.S. Department of Trade has with Canada’s copyright laws and
policies do not extend to issues regarding the circumvention of
technological protective measures, particularly considering the
CMA’s relative strength in this regard.
Even though the CMA is seen as harsh, its notice-and-notice
scheme may act in part to mitigate some concerns of Internet
users fearing copyright infringement prosecution. Notice-and-
notice may afford more opportunities than the DMCA for users
to correct any possibly infringing behavior before the threat of
litigation looms.190 Moreover, when the DMCA’s notice-and-
takedown formula is coupled with its policy on contributory lia-
bility in the wake of the Ouellette decision,191 the U.S. system
clearly puts the rights of copyright holders before the users. Af-
ter Todd Ouellette’s videos were removed from YouTube pursu-
ant to notice-and-takedown, he had little recourse to take action
against Viacom because he failed to establish bad faith on Via-
com’s part. How this fact pattern might have played out under
the CMA’s notice-and-notice scheme offers insight into that sys-
tem’s main benefit. If under a notice-and-notice regime, Ouel-
lette’s provider would not have pulled the videos off the site in
the first place—Ouellette would have first been notified of pos-
sible infringement, and the onus would have been primarily on
him to take appropriate steps to ensure that his videos did not
infringe, or at the very least, fit into some kind of statutory ex-
ception. Costly litigation could have been easily avoided had
Ouellette had the opportunity to independently pursue inquiry
into the legal status of his videos before they were “taken down.”
Under a SOPA-style regime, the consequences in infringement
cases having the added wrinkle of Internet service provider lia-
bility would reach even further, implicating the provider web-
site, and the other steps in the online chain that might somehow
188. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)–(j) (2012).
189. Copyright Modernization Act (Bill C–11), S.C. 2012, c. 20, s. 41.12–13
(Can.).
190. Irving, supra note 123.
191. That misrepresentation must reach a “high standard” under a §512(f)
claim. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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“facilitate” infringement.192 The ambiguous term “technically
feasible measures” could have an extremely far-reaching effect
on actors that only have tangential relationships to infringe-
ment.193 When examined in conjunction with a robustly devel-
oped notice-and-takedown scheme, there could be situations
where notice to any link in the digital chain of events could lead
to immediate takedowns, not to mention consequent liability
and litigation.
Though the case law arising from the DMCA has shown that
certain concessions have the possibility of being made to Inter-
net service providers, SOPA-style legislation would have the po-
tential to change those. The Viacom requirement of needing
“something more” than the right and ability to control digital in-
formation has the potential to represent a U.S. shift toward a
more calculated notice-and-takedown regime.194 Since it is up to
the users (to some extent) to self-police, automatic secondary li-
ability is not necessarily a given. Although, if SOPA’s “facilita-
tion” policy ever does take effect, it would negate the Viacom
condition of “something more,” perhaps indicating a shift toward
a copyright-holder-focused economy, and at the very least alter-
ing the delicate balance between users and rights-holders.195
In the context of user-generated content, the implications are
even bleaker under SOPA. Under the DMCA, content hosts of
user-generated material are not liable for the material that their
users upload (aside from having to comply with the notice re-
quirement). It has been suggested that SOPA, if enacted, would
have an extreme chilling effect on innovation due to the “facili-
tation” stipulation, discouraging Internet start-ups from incor-
porating in the United States, and potentially leading to in-
creased extraterritorial formation of such corporations.196 This
could in turn result in even more foreign piracy concerns and
additions to Special 301 reports in the future. The Canadian sys-
tem could mitigate these concerns: notice-and-notice, even if im-
plicated into a SOPA-style system of giving rise to liability for
“facilitating-infringement” websites, would not immediately re-
quire takedown—again, lowering the chance of litigation. As
192. Carrier, supra note 164, at 6.
193. Id. at 7.
194. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 38 (2d Cir. 2012).
195. Newman, supra note 44, at 199.
196. Mike Belleville, IP Wars: SOPA, PIPA, and the Fight over Online Piracy,
26 TEMP. INT’L AND COMP. L.J. 303, 329 (2012).
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well, the noncommercial user-generated content exception to the
CMA provides an additional avenue for content-creators to con-
tinue producing creative material without fear of infringement
and/or litigation.197 Though the CMA’s provisions can be seen as
restrictive as far as notice requirements are concerned, they do
not reach the high levels of constriction implicit in SOPA’s lan-
guage.
Throughout the CMA, Canada also attempts to mitigate the
Tenenbaum problem of potentially massive statutory damages.
With the DMCA’s high limits on such damages, litigation-based
and other “copyright troll” type business models have the poten-
tial to flourish.198 Defendants can be pressured into huge settle-
ments when the threat of extreme minimum damages is very
real. Ostensibly, in efforts to preempt the U.S. problem of mas-
sive liability for noncommercial infringement,199 statutory dam-
ages are capped in the CMA at $5,000 CAD “with respect to all
infringements involved in the proceedings.”200 Commercial in-
fringement is also capped at $20,000 USD201—a far cry from the
DMCA’s $1,000,000 USD maximum penalty.202
Interestingly, there is an exception carved out in the CMA in
terms of statutory damages with respect to copyright infringers
who infringe upon works for personal use: recovery of such dam-
ages is not possible for copyright owners in these situations.203
It seems that this exception alleviates the Tenenbaum prob-
lem.204 As far as the personal use carve-out is concerned, the
CMA can be seen as a more user’s-rights-friendly piece of legis-
lation that future lawmakers in the United States could look to
in order to mitigate the problem of controversially massive mon-
etary damage awards disproportionate with actual damages.205
197. See supra Part IV.A.
198. James DeBriyn, Shedding Light on Copyright Trolls: An Analysis of
Mass Copyright Litigation in the Age of Statutory Damages, 19 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 79, 91 (2012).
199. Geist, supra note 124, at 289.
200. Copyright Modernization Act (Bill C–11), S.C. 2012, c. 20, s. 38.1 (Can.).
201. Id.
202. See supra Part IV.A.
203. Copyright Modernization Act, s. 41.1(3). The specific section of the stat-
ute states that “[t]he owner of the copyright . . . may not elect . . . to recover
statutory damages from an individual who [infringed] only for his or her own
private purposes.” Id.
204. See supra Part IV.B.3.
205. See Geist, supra note 124, at 289.
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Regardless of their differences, the Canadian and U.S. models
of copyright protection are converging in some respects. This has
become abundantly clear in the context of fair use and fair deal-
ing in the wake of the copyright pentalogy decisions. Fair use in
the United States has been said to function as a “subsidy . . . to
permit the second author to make limited use of the first au-
thor’s work for the public good,” insofar as the general public
stands to reap reward from increased scholarship, as well as a
sense of external benefit and understanding.206 It is inherently
flexible.207 By creating low thresholds to reach the first step of
fair-dealing analyses,208 Bell and Alberta (Education) assign
great importance to public goods—specifically research and
scholarship. This signals a shift, at least in terms of judicial in-
terpretation of Canadian copyright law, to an open framework of
fair dealing that focuses more on the statutory criteria for fair-
ness, rather than on “whether the intended use qualifies for one
of the permitted purposes.”209 The schemas of the two countries
seem to be melding together, and the latter category of fair deal-
ing seems to be perfunctory; easily reachable in the wake of Bell
and Alberta (Education).210
CONCLUSION
There has been a clear shift in the digital age to a more uni-
form theory of copyright protection across the U.S.-Canada bor-
der. Nonetheless, it is not so simple to determine if the new
frameworks favor content producers or copyright owners, and to
what extent complete convergence is in store for the future. The
Canadian fair use to fair dealing shift is a path toward a U.S.-
influenced scheme that presents as more favorable to users, but
the positive impact of such shift has the potential to be mitigated
by the CMA’s harsh digital-locks provisions. Critics have lauded
the Canadian statutory damages caps, however, as a way to
solve a “fragmented and inefficient” system in the United
206. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478
(1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
207. Michael Geist, Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from Fair
Dealing to Fair Use, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
SHOOKTHEFOUNDATIONS OFCANADIANCOPYRIGHTLAW 157, 161 (Michael Geist
ed., 2013).
208. Macklem, supra note 21, at 273.
209. Geist, supra note 207, at 158.
210. Id. at 178.
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States,211 and notice-and-notice seems to be a more balanced ap-
proach to the continued problem of infringement—particularly
considering the response to SOPA’s “technically feasible” pro-
posal.212 As yet, there is no perfect solution to solving the inher-
ent copyright tension between creators and consumers—but will
there ever be?
Looking forward, although the U.S. Department of Trade may
still keep a watchful eye on Canadian intellectual property laws
and policies, the two countries’ convergence in so many respects
means that there will be fewer “Canadian pirates” to fear. An-
other recent development is the signing of the Trans-Pacific
Partnership by Canada and the United States,213 which has the
potential to, yet again, reform the copyright law in both nations.
The next round of proposed legislation is nevertheless always
just around the corner, and since restrictive copyright statutes
have been the norm in recent years, the trend could lead to fur-
ther merging of legal theories in favor of copyright owners. In
such a rapidly developing and hotly contested field, there is al-
ways room for copyright competition.
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